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I. INTRODUCTION
At a College of Europe Workshop 1 in 2007, I was asked to
elaborate on the idea that what really emerged from the World
Trade Orangization’s (“WTO”) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property law (“TRIPS Agreement”) 2 in 1994
was “an incipient transnational system of innovation.” 3 This idea
was initially put forward in an article that Keith Maskus and I
published in our book about the growing tendency of multilateral
intellectual property negotiations to disrupt the capacity of nation
states to maintain the supply of such critical public goods as education, public health, environmental safety, and scientific re*
Copyright Jerome H. Reichman, 2007, Bunyan S. Womble Professor of Law, Duke
University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina. An earlier version of this article appeared in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 17-41 (Inge
Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds., 2007).
1.
College of Europe, Workshop on Issues of Public Policy and Trade in Intellectual
Property Law, Bruges, Belgium, Oct. 5, 2005.
2.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 33-41
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND IP].
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search. 4 In the present article, I will summarize some of the main
themes from our previous work and focus attention on the difficulties of nurturing a transnational system of innovation that could
properly balance the needs of states at different levels of economic
development.
Part I identifies some of the paradoxes that have emerged from
overzealous efforts to re-regulate the global economy, in order to
make it safe for investors in the production of knowledge goods,
despite the long-standing drive of trade policy to deregulate that
same economy in the name of free competition. Part II discusses
the governance deficiencies that currently frustrate the need to
balance public and private interests at the multilateral level.
Part III focuses on specific problems of maintaining the supply
of knowledge as a global public good 5 in the face of the highprotectionist ethos driving current trade policy and of the governance problems identified in Part II. Part IV concludes with a warning about the risks of succumbing to a dogmatic intellectual property ideology precisely at a moment when history beckons state
actors to engage in open-minded experimentation with promising
new technologies and with new legal tools to promote their development and widespread diffusion.
II. REGULATORY PARADOXES OF THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY
Let me first point out that, in an effort to promote trade in
knowledge goods, we have paradoxically and energetically been reregulating the global economy in ways that contradict the sixtyyear historical mission of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). 6 That mission was precisely to deregulate the
global economy in the interest of free competition. 7
I find it disconcerting that “free traders” acquiesce so readily in
this process of re-regulation, without critically examining the
premise that ever-expanding intellectual property rights must enhance global economic welfare. One high-level governmental study,
and many reputable intellectual property scholars, have ques-

4.
5.

See generally INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3.
See, e.g., J.E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY ( I. Kaul et al., eds., 1999).
6. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter GATT
1994].
7. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions, 28 BROOK J. INT’L. L. 11 (1992).
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tioned the wisdom behind this high-protectionist agenda. 8 Professor Thomas Dreier’s thoughtful comments on this and related topics also reflect growing concerns about ever-expanding intellectual
property rights, at least with regard to the border with competition
law. 9 Nevertheless, the notion that more intellectual property protection necessarily translates into more innovation has been so
successfully promoted in recent years that few trade economists
even bother to ask whether multiplying legal monopolies may not
hamstring innovation and competitive enterprise in the end.
When the GATT was adopted, the prevailing norm at the international level was that intellectual property rights represented
islands of protection in a sea of free competition. Those islands
were largely left to the domestic laws, which, however, were subject to norms of reasonableness and necessity under Article XX(d)
of the GATT 1947. 10 This provision expressly ordained that domestic intellectual property laws should not become disguised barriers
to trade. 11
In contrast, when one reviews the massive amounts of intellectual property legislation that characterize the post-TRIPS model at
every level, it seems more accurate to speak of islands of competition in a sea of legal monopolies. It is at best unclear who represents the larger public interest 12 in negotiating forums dominated
by powerful multinational firms that behave increasingly like a

8. See, e.g., Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 8, 21-27 (2000) [hereinafter CIPR]; Carlos M.
Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 WIS. INT’L. L.J.
523, 544-50 (2002); John. H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPS: International Trade in Information Intensive Products, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 473 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 819 (2003); James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property,
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2004). For an insightful review and analysis of this literature, see
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821
(2006).
9. See Thomas Dreier, Shaping a Fair International IPR-Regime in a Globalized
World—Some Parameters for Public Policy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 43-75 (Inge Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds., 2007).
10. See GATT 1994, supra note 6, at art. XX(d), carrying forward original article XX(d)
in GATT 1947.
11. See GATT 1994, supra note 6, at art. XX, chapeau clause, disallowing measures
that constitute “a disguised restriction on international trade” (carrying forward same language from GATT 1947).
12. For a discussion of the ambiguities inherent in the term “public interest,” see
Dreier, supra note 9, who correctly observes that IPRs are given birth as an expression of
the public interest in creativity and innovation. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, did not equate the larger public interest with consumer
access to knowledge or knowledge goods as such, although it is one component of a broader
equation. Nor do we equate the broader public interest with “the sum total of private interests.” That, indeed, is why we chose to focus on the “privatization of global public goods.”
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“knowledge cartel.” 13 This process has been dramatically evidenced
in the recent Free Trade Negotiations, where the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) directly espouses the interests of the
pharmaceutical and entertainment industries, among others, in
securing provisions that sometimes exceed what is permitted by
congressionally enacted U.S. laws. 14
Yet, there is reason to fear that the members of this “knowledge cartel” are more interested in “lock[ing] in temporary competitive advantages” from existing innovation than in formulating
measures that would advance “the global public interest in [future]
innovation, competition, or the provision of complementary public
goods.” 15 This one-sided drive to re-regulate the global economy
thus produces distortions to trade that can impede worldwide economic growth in the long term.
For example, re-regulation can disrupt the transfer of technology under market conditions by allowing dominant firms to refuse
to deal with would-be competitors in developing countries or to
demand such increased rent extraction for up-to-date technology
(based on immunities from reverse-engineering under TRIPS) that
the welfare gains from technology installation are lost. Moreover,
the same intellectual property standards that impede reverseengineering also hinder local manufacturers’ efforts to add value
and improvements to the existing technological base. 16
“Without a legitimizing governance process that adequately
represents all stakeholders,” Maskus and I fear that a re-regulated
global market will “reflect dubious practices in developed markets
for knowledge goods that may actually hamper both innovation
and competition in the long run.” 17 There is a “further risk that an
over-regulated market for knowledge goods could compromise the

13. Id. at 19. See also John. Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE (C. Bellman et al., eds., 2003) (stressing difficulties of entry
into markets “dominated by multinational oligopolies” that are “compounded by the international IP system”).
14. See Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Trade Framework: Trends in Developing Countries, 98 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. Proceedings 95, 97 (2004);
Graham Dutfield, North/South: An Assymetric Global Market?, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, 9-11 September 2006.
15. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at
19.
16. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer
to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 227-56;
Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 309-20.
17. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at
20.
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ability of nation states to supply other public goods that only they
can provide in a decentralized world economy.” 18
Beyond the potential negative effects on innovation, the drive
for ever stronger international IP standards is also disrupting the
provision of other key public goods that are essential components
of global public welfare, such as education, public health, environmental protection, food, security, scientific research, and competition. 19 Increasingly, the knowledge inputs needed to promote these
public goods are subject to exclusive property rights, and they are
made available at high prices or on terms and conditions that render it difficult for ministries to provide essential public goods at
the national level. Yet, these ministries were usually not represented at the negotiating forums where international intellectual
property standards were set; and in these forums, there has been
little regard to the impacts of intellectual property rights on the
provisions of global public goods generally.
III. BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN AN INCIPIENT
TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION
Maskus and I concede that an “incipient transnational system
of innovation” could enable successful innovators in all
countries 20 —developed or developing—to reach an integrated
world market. 21 If one believes that carefully calibrated intellectual property rights provide needed incentives to invest in risky
forms of innovation, the public benefits likely to accrue from
scientific and technological progress under such a worldwide
18. Id. at 20. See generally PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION (I. Kaul et al., eds., 2003); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Cambridge University Press 2003).
19. See, e.g. Paul A. David, Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace: The Economics of an ‘Out-ofBalance’ Regime of Private Property Rights in Data and Information, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 81-120; Ruth Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 142-87; Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND IP, supra note 3 at 393-424; Hans Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection
and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 726-57.
20. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at
33-35 (stressing that “[a]ll countries could benefit from a functionally efficient transnational
system of innovation if low barriers to entry enabled entrepreneurs anywhere to invest in
the production and distribution of knowledge goods.”).
21. See, e.g., Asish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri & Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for Technology, Intellectual Property Rights and Development, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
IP, supra note 3 at 321-336; see also Michael Blakeney, Stimulating Agricultural Innovation, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 367-390; Keith E. Maskus,
Kamal Saggi & Thitima Puttitanum, Patent Rights and International Technology Transfer
Through Direct Investment and Licensing, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra
note 3 at 265-80.
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logical progress under such a worldwide system are potentially incalculable. 22
There are serious obstacles to achieving such progress, however. In practice, the different national and regional capabilities
and endowments of WTO Members limit their absorptive capacities and reduce the potential benefits of open markets for knowledge goods. This “technological divide” is widened by the high
rents that must now be paid to technology exporters and by the
absence of provisions conferring differential and more favorable
treatment on developing countries under the TRIPS Agreement, 23
even though that principle had been enshrined in the GATT (1947)
at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979. 24 The only differential
treatment under TRIPS is now reserved for Least-Developed
Countries (LDCs), the poorest of the poor, whose general compliance obligations have just been extended to 2013 (in addition to
further exemptions for the patenting of pharmaceutical producst
until 2016). 25
Disregarding the LDCs, all other developing countries—
whether they fall in the high, medium, or low income brackets—
must accordingly compete in markets for knowledge goods on
roughly the same normative terms and conditions that govern advanced industrialized countries. A growing number of these developing countries have demonstrated considerable capacity in some
technological fields, and some are beginning to challenge the technological supremacy of the OECD countries. 26 Nevertheless, all of
22. See, e.g., M. P. Ryan, Useful Knowledge and the Development Agenda Debate at
WIPO, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, 9-11
September 2006. However, some commentators believe that many developing countries
should focus on comparative advantages in agriculture and other local endowments, rather
than technological innovation. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 9.
23. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65 (Transitional Arrangements).
24. See GATT (1947), supra note 6, Part IV, “Results of the Uruguay Round — Legal
Texts” 533-37 (1994).
25. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 65-66; World Trade Organization, Ministerial, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 14 November 2001 [hereinafter Doha Declaration on Public Health],
A7; Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Extension of the Transition Period
under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with respect to Pharmaceutical Products Council for Trade-Related Aspect
of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. IP/C/25, (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Decision on
the 2016 Extension]. LDCs may postpone implementation of other TRIPS obligations, including the duty to provide patent protection for products other than pharmaceuticals, until
2013. See Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WTO Doc. IP/C/40
(Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Decision on the 2013 Extension]. During these transition periods, LDCs must continue to respect national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN)
obligations under arts. 3-4 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2.
26. See, e.g., J. Straus, The Impact of GATT and TRIPS on Economic Development,
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them are struggling to cope with the enormous challenges and
burdens, including financial burdens, thrust upon them by a universal set of relatively high intellectual property standards. 27
These burdens and challenges affect even those developing
countries that are not actively engaged in the production of knowledge goods. Such countries must nonetheless organize and maintain the defense of foreign intellectual property owners, with serious repercussions for their internal ability to meet, say, public
education and public health goals at prices their general populations can afford. 28
In other words, even developing countries that opt out of the
world’s innovation “tournaments” must engage in burdensome efforts to cope with the social costs of world intellectual property
norms, including the distributional inequities that poverty greatly
magnifies. They must cope, with varying degrees of success, with
the so-called “flexibilities” built into the TRIPS Agreement itself,
which could, if mastered, potentially lower those same social
costs. 29 Increasingly, developing countries must also deal with official and unofficial pressures and threats to provide higher TRIPSplus levels of intellectual property protection, which may become
embodied in bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements. 30
When, instead, developing countries opt into the production of
knowledge goods for local consumption or export purposes, they
face an even more complex and burdensome “balancing act.” On
the one hand, they must internalize universal IP norms in ways
that stimulate relevant industrial sectors having innovative potenpaper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, 9-11 September 2006 (stressing successes of China and India). See also Dutfield, supra note 14 (predicting shift in terms of knowledge goods trade to detriment of current technology exporters).
27. See generally CIPR, supra note 8. See also Chon, supra note 8 at 2839-58 (criticizing intergovernmental efforts and scholarly analysis of IP problems as insufficiently
grounded in development theory and practice).
28. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 19; Abbott, supra note 19. See also Timothy Swanson
& Timo Goeschl, Diffusion and Distribution: The Impacts on Poor Countries of Technological
Enforcement Within the Biotechnological Sector, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP,
supra note 3 at 669-94.
29. For detailed discussion of these flexibilities, see generally, U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD) AND INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD), RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005). See also
Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU J. INT’L. L. & POL. 11 (1997); Carolos M. Correa, Formulating
Effective Pro-Development National Intellectual property Policies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13 at 209 et seq. For discussion of distributional effects, see, e.g., Peter M.
Gerhart, Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of Global Public
Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 69-77.
30. Supra note 14.
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tial without, however, legally discriminating against foreign competitors. The national treatment principle of the TRIPS Agreement 31 —which the WTO Appellate Body has deemed a cardinal
premise of the worldwide intellectual property system 32 —thus reinforces the lack of “differential and more favorable treatment” in
that same Agreement.
This formidable challenge is then made considerably more difficult by the countervailing welfare goals these countries must also
meet, for political reasons, among others, with respect to, say, public health and public education. Here, in short, even economically
dynamic developing countries must resolve tensions between calibrating TRIPS-compliant domestic IP norms to stimulate innovation and adjusting the same set of norms to provide access to
knowledge and medicines on affordable terms and conditions. 33
These efforts are reflected, for example, in India’s new patent law,
where efforts to stimulate the research-based pharmaceutical sector increasingly conflict with efforts to preserve the well-developed
capacity of local producers to supply low-cost generic drugs to both
domestic and foreign consumers. 34
More generally, the TRIPS Agreement has thus obliged developing countries to engage in a delicate balancing act between
stimulating the production of private knowledge goods, when feasible, and maintaining the supply of essential public goods. 35 Public international law, however, affords them little guidance in
choosing normative and practical tools for achieving this balance.
Rather, the relentless drive to privatize knowledge goods, which
has picked up even more steam in bilateral and regional FTAs
since TRIPS (despite implicit promises to the contrary during the
Uruguay Round), has been accompanied by no comparable collective action at the intergovernmental level to preserve and coordinate the supply of global public goods. This governance gap persists despite a growing clamor for such initiatives by NGOs en31. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3 & 4.
32. United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (Havana Club),
January 2, 2002, DSR 2002: II 589, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R.
33. See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921 (2007).
34. See, e.g., J. M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of
India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation (draft version,
August, 2006), University of Pittsburg School of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper
no. 43 at http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/papers/art 43; Janis M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to
India—Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to Medicines, 356 NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 54
(Feb. 8, 2007).
35. For deep conceptual issues, see Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, at 46-64.
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gaged in “regime shifting” tactics 36 and by the so-called “Friends of
Development,” who have sought to prod the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) in new, more development-friendly
directions. 37
Indeed, we have no trusted governance mechanism for balancing public and private interests in this emerging transnational
system of innovation at all. 38 We lack clear theoretical premises or
empirical evidence to determine which intellectual property standards would best promote diverse goals over time. 39 We have generated few ideas, and little discussion about how to maintain the
supply of other global public goods — including knowledge itself —
under a supra-national intellectual property regime. 40 And we
have not even begun to acknowledge the need to deal with adverse
distributional impacts, especially on the poor, that even the most
carefully balanced intellectual property regime may produce. 41
IV. MAINTAINING THE SUPPLY OF KNOWLEDGE AS A GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOOD
In the rest of this article, I focus primary attention on the topic
of innovation itself, and particularly its dependence on the continued upstream availability of knowledge as both a domestic and a
global public good. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winner, has
written brilliantly on this general concept. 42 Moreover, recent efforts to focus attention on both human rights and human welfare
in the context of overall development goals has added new and
welcome dimensions to the debate about international IPRs. 43
36. See generally L. R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
37. See infra note 52; for details, see Chon, supra note 8 at 2844-49 (citing authorities).
38. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at
18-20.
39. See generally Jerome H. Reichman & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization without
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J.
85 (2007).
40. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsberg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?, The WTO
Panel Decision and the “Three Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE INTERNADROIT
D’AUTEUR
3,
January
2001
available
at
SSRN:
TIONALE
DU
http://ssrn.com/abstract=253867; Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND IP, supra note 3 at 27-33, 41-45; see generally P. Drahos, supra note 35 at 46-68.
41. See, e.g., Gerhart, supra note 29; Chon supra note 8.
42. See generally Stiglitz, supra note 5.
43. See, e.g., Chon, supra note 8 at 2859-909 (stressing access to knowledge as key to
capacity building); Helfer, supra note 33. See also Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, Mich. St. Univ. C. of L., Legal Studies
Research
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
04-01,
2006,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927335.
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Nevertheless, these approaches should not deflect attention from
more specific needs to devise an economically stable innovation
system potentially of benefit to all countries, even if they raise
searching questions about distributive justice and larger developmental goals that cannot be ignored.
For present purposes, I wish to underscore the extent to which
today’s high protectionist agenda progressively tends to compromise the availability of knowledge inputs needed for future innovation by expanding the protection of contemporary outputs as if
there were no tomorrow. 44 This short-sighted approach threatens
to disrupt the delicate “ecology of information” that James Boyle
has eloquently portrayed. 45
A fundamental problem is that international trade negotiations
have not self-consciously postulated the need to seek intellectual
property norms and incentives that would best advance the incipient worldwide system of innovation as such. 46 On the contrary,
special interest lobbyists claiming to know what best serves that
system have promoted normative solutions that maximize rents
from existing innovation. These self-serving IP proposals are then
exchanged for trade concessions in other areas that may or may
not advance the long-term interests of the technology importing
countries. 47
This linkage methodology first evolved in the 1980s, when a
Cold War political stalemate had blocked the progressive harmonization of rudimentary international IP standards at WIPO, and
countries at very different levels of development were unwilling to
exchange purely IP concessions as such. Once a more robust
transnational IP system had been installed on the shoulders of the
44. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca. S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 690 (1998); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33 (2003); Arto K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001); Paul A.
David, A Tragedy of the Public Knowledge “Commons? Global Science, Intellectual Property
and the Digital Technology Boomerang, SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 00-02, Stanford Inst.
for Economic Pol’y Research (2000), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/0002.html (last visited Jan. 8 2004).
45. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net, 47
DUKE L.J. 87 (1997).
46. See, e.g., JAYASHEE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001); Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues & HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L
L. R. 591 (2003); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
369 (2006). See generally G. H. Evans, The Making of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 WORLD COMPETITION 137-180 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 415 (2004) (showing that these agreements seek to capture positive externalities and spillovers from existing innovation).
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TRIPS Agreement, however, continued reliance on this linkage
methodology has undermined the stability of that very system by
blinding negotiators to the cumulative social costs of unbalanced,
over-protectionist IP regimes even in the most advanced economies.
Respectable economic inquiry has never been more perplexed
and uncertain about the potential hazards of our ever-expanding,
ever more protectionist intellectual property regimes. 48 Nor have
serious efforts been made to reconcile the private and public interests of countries at different levels of development, with a view to
optimizing global welfare in a healthy competitive environment. 49
Indeed, in some countries, especially the United States, even the
word “competition” has become suspect under an antitrust law
that increasingly views monopoly as a socially desirable tool to
promote research and development. 50 Yet, those who cling to this
pessimistic Schumpetarean outlook largely ignore, or at least under-appreciate, the extent to which so much of today’s basic research is performed at government expense in universities and
other government-funded entities. The very success of this growing
public-private partnership in technological innovation 51 could instead justify a greater degree of competition in downstream applications and improvements than was previously thought economically desirable.
While a group of developing countries has recently called for
sustained economic analysis of these questions at the international
level, 52 the most powerful countries’ trade negotiators relentlessly
48. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (Princeton University Press 2004); David, supra notes 19 & 44; Keith E. Maskus,
Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 2219 (2000); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000).
49. CIPR, supra note 8; Branstetter, supra note 16; see also Ullrich, supra note 19 at
726-57.
50.See, e.g., J. Drexl, Intellectual Property Rights as Constituent Elements of the Market
Order, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, September 9-11 2006; Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global Commons from
the Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 758-69; see
also S. Ghosh, Comment: Competitive Baselines for Intellectual Property in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 793-814.
51. See, e.g., DAVID MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT (Stanford University Press 2004).
52. See WIPO General Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11, 27 August 2004;
Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in
Document WO/GA/31/11, WIPO Doc IIM/1/4, 6 April 2005; Proposal by Morocco on Behalf of
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seek to export their increasingly dysfunctional intellectual property systems to the rest of the world at the very time when those
systems are in danger of breaking down at home. 53 If these trends
continue unabated, the poorly designed intellectual property
mechanisms forged in bilateral and multilateral forums could stifle
rather than accelerate the pace of innovation in the emerging
transnational system.
We ignore, for example, the extent to which low eligibility standards and dubious conceptual formulations have flooded technology markets with weak patents that generate thickets of rights
and other blocking effects, which in turn shift funds away from
R&D into wasteful litigation and other counter-measures. 54 We
ignore the spreading tentacles of copyright law, which have made
truly creative expression ever more difficult by narrowing user and
public-interest safeguards, 55 and which have surrounded computer
programs and other functional works with impenetrable legal and
technological fences. 56 We risk elevating the costs of R&D across
entire economies through database protection laws so poorly designed 57 that they have embarrassed both the highest court called

the African Group Entitled The African Proposal for the Establishment of a Development
Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc IIM/3/2, 18 July 2005. See also S. Musungu & G. Dutfield,
Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), (QUNO/QIAP), TRIPS Issues Paper 3, 2003; C. L. Deere, What Next for the
Development Agenda at WIPO? Priorities for 2006, BRIDGES, ICTSD, February 2006.
53. See, e.g., Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra
note 3 at 20-23 (citing authorities); Reichman & Dreyfuss, Patent Law Harmonization, supra note 39.
54. See supra note 39; Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 48; B. Verbeure et al., Patent Pools
and Diagnostic Testing, 24 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 115 (2006); Geertrui Van Overwalle
et al., Models for Facilitating Access to Patents on Genetic Inventions, 7 NATURE REVIEW
GENETICS 143 (2006); J. Warloin, The Tsunami of Biotech Patents, paper presented to the
International Workshop on Gene Patents and Clearing Models: From Concepts to Cases,
Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium, 8-10 June 2006.
55. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A
Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected
Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY L.J. 98 (2007). See also R. Cooper Dreyfuss,
TRIPS — Round II: Should Users Strike Back, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004). Ruth L.
Okedigi, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, 142-87.
56. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 9; Pamela Samuelson, Ramdall Davis, Mitchell.D.
Kapr & Jerome H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2203 (1994); Jerome H. Reichman & Johnathan A. Franklin,
Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention
Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2003).
57. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, O.J. (1996) L 77/20; Jerome H. Reichman and
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997);
Jerome H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE, 455 (2002).
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to enforce them 58 and even the legislative entity that spawned
them. 59 And we continue to roll out competition laws and policies
that claim to advance innovation — as if that were not sufficiently
the province of IPRs — rather than to reign in anticompetitive arrangements that limit both the diffusion of innovation and the
pace of improvements. 60
Professor Dreier rightly reminds us that the advent of new
technologies requires some adjustments of pre-existing IP paradigms and that allowing users and consumers to free-ride on investments in such technologies would also constitute a shortsighted policy resulting in market failure. 61 But few, if any, reputable scholars endorse such policies. The scarecrow of free-riding
has become a political gambit to steer legislators away from softer
modalities of protection that could overcome market failure with
lower social costs and without unnecessarily impeding future innovation. 62
A. Rationalizing the Protection of Cumulative and Sequential
Innovation
Professor Dreier has called attention to special problems posed
by information technologies and biotechnology, in which each new
advance seems to depend upon a mix of preceding innovative contributions. This phenomenon is, indeed, the problem of “cumulative and sequential innovation,” which I have addressed in a number of monographs and articles. 63
58. See, e.g., Case C-203/02, British Horse-racing Board Ltd v. William Hill Organization, Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. I-10415; Case C-46/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus AB,
2004 E.C.R. I-10365.
59. Commission of the European Communities, First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC
on the Legal Protection of Databases, DG Internal Market and Services working paper,
Brussels, Dec. 12, 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/interval/market/copyright/docs/databases
/evaluationreporten.pdf. But see Estelle Derclaye, IPRs on Information and Market Power:
Comparing the European and American Protections of Databases, paper presented to the
International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual
Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, September 9-11, 2006 (advocating European approach with
certain modifications).
60. See Drexl, supra note 50; Fox, supra note 50; Ullrich, supra note 19; see also M.D.
Janis, “Minimal” Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust Law Under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 774-792.
61. Dreier, supra note 9. See also James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What Squabbles Over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT 97-118 (F. Scott Kieft ed., Elsevier Academic Press 2003).
62. Jerome H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 61 at 289-301.
63. See Dreier, supra note 9; Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu:
Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2002); Jerome H.
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Traditional patent law presupposes clear boundaries between
non-obvious inventions, and it proceeds on the assumption that the
initial inventor is best-equipped to develop the new product or
process and bring it to market in an efficient manner. The powerful exclusive rights of the patent paradigm rest upon both these
premises and make it possible for innovators to exchange their
creations for value in the absence of market failure. 64
In reality, the conditions of present-day technological innovation increasingly contradict and confound these premises. 65 When
patents are freely granted for merely incremental additions to the
knowledge stock, as routinely occurs under today’s low eligibility
requirements, innovations clustering around common technical
trajectories overlap, with no clear proprietarial lines of demarcation. 66 These proliferating patents then give rise to thickets of
rights that produce blocking effects on both follow-on innovation
and upstream basic research. 67 Scarce resources needed for R&D
are progressively diverted to litigation seeking judicial clarification
of boundary lines that are inherently blurred by definition. 68
Meanwhile, the pace of innovation is further slowed because
exclusive property rights in “slivers of innovation” act as a barrier
to entry to those who must use existing inventions to produce
value-adding improvements. 69 Experience with small-scale innovation in different fields suggests that the market often discerns the
course of improvements faster than the initial innovator, and that
would-be competitors would move quickly to invest in value-adding
improvements but for the potential blocking effects of the firstcomer’s exclusive rights. Exchange often fails to occur because the
second comers fear to disclose small-scale applications of knowReichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2342 (1994).
64. See, e.g., Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System 20 J. L. &
ECON. 265 (1997); Edmund Kitch Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1737 (2000); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2225-27
(2000).
65. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michelle Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2006); Rai, supra note 44;
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 44; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra
note 61 at 325-53.
66. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 65; see also supra note 54.
67. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 65 at 339-353; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 61 at.209-30; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 41.
68. Cf., e.g. W. Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 653-61.
69. See Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, supra note 62.
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how to the initial innovator and cannot proceed to deliver valueadding improvements without incurring the risk of actions for infringement. 70 The domestic patent laws, and their sui generis
counterparts, thus clumsily impede the pace of innovation because
of a well-intentioned aim to immunize the first-comers from freeriding appropriations of their initial investments in R&D.
From a broader perspective, the forgoing analysis shows the
dominant Cosean model, in which rational actors contract around
strong and clearly defined exclusive property rights, 71 to be at war
with two pre-existing subsystems on which competitive economies
traditionally depended. One such subsystem was the set of liability
rules that governed trade secrets in the past, especially when patents were hard to obtain because of high eligibility standards, and
routine engineers could freely provide value-adding improvements
by reverse-engineering the technical know-how embodied in subpatentable innovation. 72 The second major subsystem undermined
by a mindless expansion of exclusive property rights was the Mertonian model of open access and sharing of scientific research results, which provided a continuous flow of upstream knowledge
inputs often funded by government science agencies. 73 It also complicates the evolution of promising new innovation models based
on voluntary forms of coordinated collective action. 74
From a theoretical perspective, I have elsewhere argued that
policymakers should be exploring and experimenting with novel
intellectual property regimes that could defend cumulative and
sequential innovation against free-riding appropriators without
unduly blocking value-adding improvements and without depriving first-comers of a fair share of the revenues from such improvements. To this end, a set of “take and pay” liability rules, known as
a “compensatory liability regime,” can be fashioned to regulate the
pace of improvements while impeding wholesale duplication of pro70. See Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 63 (discussing Arrow’s Information Paradox).
71. See Rober P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994).
72. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 63.
73. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property
Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001); Jerome H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir,
A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317 (2003); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION
LAW 191-221 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Husgenholtz eds., Kluwer Law International 2006)
[hereinafter Patenting Science].
74. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin or Linnux and the Nature of the Firm,
102 YALE L. J. 369 (2002); see also GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: LINUX AND THE OPEN
SOURCE REVOLUTION (Perseus Books Group 2002).
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tected small-scale innovation. 75 This alternative form of protection
would provide ex ante entitlements to promote value-adding uses
of cumulative and sequential innovation with low transaction costs
and fewer barriers to entry, and it would also avoid many of the
coordination problems that frustrate the collective action needed
for complex innovative undertakings. 76
This is not the place to explore such proposals in detail. I mention them here because they attempt to address the problems that
an increasingly dysfunctional intellectual property system has elicited. Many other ambitious proposals are on the table, such as
open-source initiatives, patent pools, science commons and other
clearing house models, 77 which merit investigation and study. Yet,
all these worthwhile responses to the pressing problems of the day
could be compromised if the knowledge cartel that has captured
the international IP law-making process continues to ratchet up
ever-more protectionist standards in the name of so-called “harmonization.”
B. A Moratorium on Stronger International Intellectual Property
Standard-Setting Exercises
The forgoing discussion suggests that the last thing that an incipient transnational system of innovation needs at the moment
are additional rounds of international IP law-making exercises. On
the contrary, the developing countries need a breathing space in
which to accommodate the social costs of the TRIPS Agreement
(and posterior TRIPS-plus agreements, if any). They must particularly master the nuances of existing international standards of
protection, including both built-in and subsequently added flexibilities, with a view to adapting this legal infrastructure to their own
assets, needs and capabilities. 78 At the same time, policymakers in
75. Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 63; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy
Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at
337-66.
76. See, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, A Philosopher’s View, paper presented to the International Workshop on Gene Patents and Clearing Models: From Concepts to Cases, Catholic
University, Leuven, Belgium, 8-10 June 2006.
77. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); JANET HOPE, OPEN SOURCE BIOTECHNOLOGY
(forthcoming 2008); see generally papers presented to the International Workshop on Gene
Patents and Clearing Models: From Concepts to Cases, Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium, 8-10 June 2006.
78. See, e.g., Dutfield, supra note 14; see generally Mueller supra note 34 (for an indepth survey of India’s struggle to reconcile international patent standards with its own
development goals); see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 33 (discussing potential impact
of amended TRIPS provision 31bis).
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developed countries need to step back and take stock of their growing intellectual property predicaments, without worsening existing
problems by further succumbing to the “more is always better”
propaganda of a powerful knowledge cartel.
For all these reasons, Keith Maskus and I have called for a
moratorium on intellectual property standard-setting exercises for
the immediate future. In our view, “further harmonization is not
an improper goal, but rather a premature exercise under the new
and uncertain conditions that attend the development of cuttingedge technologies generally and information-based technologies in
particular.” 79
Professor Dreier correctly understands our proposal to be directed at developed and developing countries alike. 80 Our hope is
that, as states at different levels of development “accommodate[d]
existing international [IP] standards to their own nascent or evolving systems of innovation,” a body of fresh empirical data would
emerge with which to compare and test different development
strategies. 81 In the long run, such data might make it more feasible for states to trade further intellectual property concessions
once again, “on a win-win basis, without coercion and with fewer
risks that powerful interest groups had rigged the rules to lock in
fleeting competitive advantages.” 82
If developing countries (whose interests vary greatly according
to per capita GDP and industrial capacities) rallied around the call
for such a moratorium, it could help them collectively resist bilateral pressures in FTA negotiations that have so far succeeded on a
“divide and conquer” strategy. These countries should, however,
remain willing to consider minimalist, good faith responses to new
or rampant free-riding practices that might unexpectedly emerge
during the moratorium period. 83
79. Maskus & Reichman in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, at 36.
See also, Reichman & Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 39.(For efforts to bolster the recognition
of foreign judgments obtained under IP laws already conforming to TRIPS standards, see,
Jane C. Ginsberg, & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition
of Judgments, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATTERS, 77 CHI.-KENT L. R. 1065 (2002); Yoav
Ostreicher, The Rise and Fall of the “Mixed” and “Double” Convention Models Regarding
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 338
(2007).
80. See Dreier, supra note 9.
81. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at
37; see also Reichman & Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 39.
82. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at
37.
83. For example, certain rampant forms of free-riding on digital sound recordings
might require a positive response, in the spirit of TRIPS, even if not clearly covered by
treaty obligations. By the same token, had developing countries been willing to consider
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C. New Institutional Initiatives
While both the European Commission and the European Patent Office 84 have recently demonstrated greater awareness of the
dangers of extending IP protection in the absence of solid economic
justification, there is no sign that either USTR or the administration will reduce pressures currently being exerted to stiffen intellectual property standards in multilateral, regional, and bilateral
forums. 85 Accordingly, if a healthy worldwide system of innovation
is to emerge in the post-TRIPS environment, the need for a proper
balance of public and private interests within that system is factually dependent on the developing countries’ ability to resist the
drive to re-regulate the world economy. Important in this regard
was the WIPO Development Agenda, 86 and other parallel initiatives, such as the Access to Essential Medicines 87 and Access to
Knowledge 88 campaigns, whose mission it is to document developing country complaints about how they may be ill-served by TRIPS
and TRIPS-plus standards of IP protection.
At the same time, we need more reliable information about how
IPRs may be helping the developing countries, especially in certain
fields and at certain levels of per capita GDP. 89 In so doing, it is
important to take account of the different conditions affecting different industrial sectors in these countries. For example, while a
stronger patent regime has certainly caused problems for Brazil’s
public health program, 90 that country has become a major innovaearly U.S. proposals for compensatory fees for access to clinical trial data, they might have
avoided the imposition of tough exclusive rights regimes in recent FTAs. See, e.g., Jerome
Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data: From Private
to Public Goods?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES, EarthScan, (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Negotiating Health].
84. See Interviews for the Future, European Patent Office, 2006.
85. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 14.
86. See, supra note 52.
87. See, e.g., Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, Doctors Without Borders,
http://www.accessmed-msf.org; Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in 2004
and Beyond, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 83 at 41-54; Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP 393-424, supra note 3.
88. See, e.g., CPTech, Draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge, 9 May 2005, available at
http://www.cptech.org.
89. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 34 (case of Indian pharmaceutical industry); Straus,
supra note 26; Michael P. Ryan, Brazil’s Quiet Bio-Medical Innovation Revolution: Drugs,
Patents, and the ‘10/90 Health Research Gap,’ Creative and Innovative Economy Center
Research Paper (2006), available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/CIEC/Research+
Papers.htm; see also Ryan, supra note 22.
90. See, e.g., Mirta Levis, Role, Perspectives and Challenges of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry in Latin America, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 55-63, supra note 83; see also
Barbara Rosenberg, Market Concentration of the Transnational Pharmaceutical Industry
and the Generic Industries: Trends on Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Transactions, in
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tor and exporter in the aircraft industry and, allegedly, in the biomedical sector as well. 91 IPRs may have played a positive role in
both cases.
Similarly, some Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical companies
are reportedly well-positioned to benefit from universal patent
norms, even if many smaller Indian firms may be denied prior opportunities to reverse-engineer cheap generic drugs. 92 Ideally, our
quest for reliable empirical studies of what actually transpires in
developing countries should enable scholars and policymakers better to differentiate the situations in low and middle-income countries from those at a more advanced state of industrialization. 93
Because today’s most scientifically and commercially valuable
knowledge goods are likely to be products of cumulative and sequential innovation, all countries — not just developing countries
— need norms that reinforce the natural sharing ethos of public
science and that expand the semi-commons of nonpatentable or
subpatentable ideas and know-how accessible to routine engineers. 94 To this end, the developing countries in particular need to
embrace a pro-competitive ethos by strengthening their capacities
and technologies of reverse-engineering. 95 They need to experiment with new intellectual property models, including those based
on open-source solutions and on the strategic use of liability rules,
which can cure market failures without impeding follow-on innovation and without creating barriers to entry.
Above all, developing countries need to formulate suitable competition law rules and policies (hopefully coordinated) to ensure
that foreign technologies and know-how flow to local markets at
prices local entrepreneurs can afford. In so doing, they should also
make use of competition law exceptions in the TRIPS-Agreement
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 65 & 73-75, supra note 83.
91. See supra note 89.
92. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 34; Timmermans, supra note 87 at 50-53. See also
Joan Rovira, Creating and Promoting Domestic Drug Manufacturing Capabilities: A Solution for Developing Countries?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 227-40, supra note 83.
93. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Institute for International Economics 2000); Phillip McCalman, Reaping What
You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization, 55 J INT’L ECON.
161 (2001); Maskus, Lessons, supra note 48, at 2224-39.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 63-76; see also R. Cooper Dreyfuss & G. Dinwoodie, WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 861-883
(providing innovative proposals); Marianne Levin & Annette Kur, Towards More Balanced,
User Friendly Paradigms in IP Law: A Project to Reform TRIPS, Special Session: the IP in
Transition Research Programme presented to the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) conference in Parma,
Italy, (Sep. 5, 2006) (providing innovative proposals).
95. See supra note 29.
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to obtain bulk access to educational and scientific texts at prices
the local educational community can afford. 96
Ideally, all developing countries should experimentally be testing different approaches to stimulating and disseminating innovation in their national and regional systems of innovation and to
defining the relevant supporting legal standards that could prove
effective for different players at different levels of development, all
of whom are necessarily operating within the incipient transnational system of innovation. Valid experiments of this kind should
eventually lead to bottom up proposals for future intellectual property standards that are demonstrably consistent with development
goals and that suitably reconcile public and private interests at
national, regional and, ultimately, global levels. 97
Another overarching goal for developing countries is to experiment with new techniques, strategies and institutions for maintaining the supply of knowledge as a public good. While this dimension was painfully ignored during the multilateral trade negotiations that gave birth to the TRIPS Agreement, governments in
the most technologically advanced countries clearly understand
the importance of funding basic research and the need to provide
critical upstream inputs for groundbreaking scientific research,
which the private sector cannot sustain. 98 Yet, one of the biggest
defects of multilateral and bilateral standard-setting exercises,
without public interest negotiators seated at the table, is precisely
the emergence of a one dimensional normative infrastructure that
can make the provision of the public good side of innovation ever
harder and more costly. 99
In this regard, we must particularly ensure that developing
countries are connected to the worldwide flow of scientific and
technical information, in what UNESCO calls the drive for
“knowledge societies,” 100 a goal that will require restraints on electronic fencing of disembodied information. 101 We will need better
research exemptions to all intellectual property regimes. We must
96. See, e.g., Drexl, supra note 50; Correa, supra note 29; Ullrich, supra note 19;
Okediji, supra note 19.
97. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Dinwoodie, supra note 94; Levin & Kur, supra note 94.
98. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress
of Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).
99. See e.g., Patenting Science, supra note 73; Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital
Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (2003).
100. See Towards Knowledge Societies, UNESCO WORLD REPORT (UNESCO Publishing
2005).
101. See Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir, & Heather Ritch, Access to Scientific and
Technological Knowledge: UNESCO’s Past, Present and Future Roles, in UNESCO, SIXTY
YEARS OF STANDARD-SETTING IN EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE (2007).

Spring, 2007]

NURTURING

163

ensure that both government-funded and government-generated
scientific research results are widely disseminated at affordable
costs. 102 And we need to encourage developing countries to invest
wisely in forms of public-private cooperation that focus on capacity
building in universities and on the transfer of both innovative capacity and technology from the public to the private sectors.
In so doing, we must also take pains to distinguish problems of
distributive injustice from problems directly dependent on IPRs.
While these issues are often interrelated, Peter Gerhart’s recent
work shows that we have not thought enough about how developed
countries cope with distributional aspects “behind the scenes,” and
why this absence of secondary coping mechanisms magnifies the
social costs of IPRs in developing countries. 103
Finally, looking beyond innovation as such, we must find ways
to ensure that progress in stimulating the production of knowledge
goods leads to the support of other public goods, such as public
health, agriculture, the environment, education and scientific research generally. In other words, we must reverse the trend that
makes the globalization of private knowledge goods increasingly at
odds with the provision of global public goods, and instead take
steps to ensure that the emerging transnational system of innovation adequately fosters and supports the supply of both, in an environment that remains responsive to basic human needs and fundamental human rights. 104
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The TRIPS Agreement of 1994 is usually characterized as a
technical harmonization exercise that consecrates basic standards
of intellectual property protection established in developed countries. From that perspective, there has been a sustained emphasis
on compliance by other countries that must conform their laws and
practices to these international standards, and on the need for still
higher levels of protection that technology exporting countries demand in the name of efficiency and wealth maximization. 105

102. See, e.g., JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS
RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 55-69 & 111-126 (MIT Press 2006); Ruth Okediji, Toward
an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (2000).
103. See Gerhart, supra note 29; see also Chon, supra note 8.
104. See Chon, supra note 8; Yu, supra note 43.
105. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387 (2000); Yu, supra note 40; Jerome H.
Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing
Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441 (2000).
TO

164

J. OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 16:2

In contrast, Maskus and I contend that, perhaps as an unintended consequence, the TRIPS Agreement has spawned an incipient transnational system of innovation, which could provide
worldwide incentive effects with positive gains for both innovation
and welfare. A number of developing countries, including Brazil,
Chile, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand have taken steps to
profit from these opportunities, and critics of globalization ignore
these growing successes at their peril. 106
Higher intellectual property standards have nonetheless engendered new problems for all countries, and they have particularly complicated the already arduous task of formulating and implementing economic development strategies in poor countries. 107
In his early work, Maskus emphasized that IP regimes were but
one component of a healthy, development-oriented economy and
that, without a broader, well-coordinated infrastructure that included corporate law, bankruptcy law, and a solid educational system, among other variables, IP protection might add little to economic growth in its own right. 108 In a perceptive recent article,
Margaret Chon argues that the interrelation between IPRs and
overall development policies may be far more complex than was
previously understood, and that differential and more favorable
treatment — which Professor Chon calls “substantive equality” —
will become essential if developing countries are to succeed in the
post-TRIPS environment. 109
Other recent studies have focused on the interplay of private
and public goods in a healthy, pro-competitive global economy. 110
One key phenomenon here is the extent to which expanding international IP legislation to support the “globalization of private
knowledge goods” has increasingly burdened and complicated developing country efforts to achieve broader development goals that
106. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 26; Ryan, supra note 22.
107. See, e.g., Dutfield, supra note 14 (documenting the role of low intellectual property
standards in the history of developed countries’ technological evolution); Paul J. Heald,
Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS
Game, 88 Minn. L. Rev 249 (2003). See also Ketih Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual
Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998).
108. See Maskus, supra note 93; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Taking the Medicine
with Angst: An Economist’s View of the TRIPS Agreement, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 795, 802
(2001) (reviewing Keith E. Maskus, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000)).
109. See generally Chon, supra note 8. Whether articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, provide some legal foundation for preferential treatment for poor countries remains an open question. See, e.g., Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines
Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493, 502
(2000).
110. See generally INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3.
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provide both measurable economic growth and equitable access to
the fruits of growth for poor and disadvantaged citizens. 111 While
history demonstrates that the enforcement of intellectual property
rights and the pursuit of overall economic welfare are not antithetical in relatively free-market economies, as some human rights
declarations expressly recognize, the one-sided emphasis on private rights in the WTO and WIPO law-making processes has made
it far more difficult than in the past for most developing countries
to bridge the technology divide 112 and to maintain the supply of
such basic public goods as health, education, food security, environmental protection and even a pro-competitive economic environment.
In this regard, they have so far received little comfort from the
WTO Dispute Settlement apparatus, which has tended to ignore
adverse distributional effects of the TRIPS standards, despite certain enabling provisions in that agreement. 113 While recent legislative concessions regarding public health adopted by the WTO 114
may be seen as a partial response to demands for less “formal
equality” 115 and more “substantive equality,” 116 the developing
countries have largely been left on their own to sort out the developmental difficulties that TRIPS and post-TRIPS pressures have
engendered. 117
From a broader perspective, the incipient transnational system
of innovation that the TRIPS Agreement brought to life in 1994
needs time and a stable competitive environment in which to grow
and flourish through the efforts of entrepreneurs in both developed
and developing countries, without further top-down regulatory interference from misguided protectionist legislation. WTO Members
111. See generally Maskus & Reichman in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3.
112. See, e.g., Towards Knowledge Societies, UNESCO WORLD REPORT, supra note 100;
PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (New Press 2002); see also Heald, supra note 107; Peter K. Yu, Bridging
the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1 (2002).
113. See Howse, supra note 109: Gerhart, supra note 29; but see Jerome H. Reichman,
Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v. India, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585,
586 & 594-97 (1998)(finding that WTO Appellate Body may defer to local law under art. 1.1
of TRIPS when good-faith effort to comply is otherwise demonstrated).
114. See supra note 25; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 33.
115. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics
of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95, 95-96 (2004).
116. See Chon, supra note 8.
117. Post-TRIPS Pressures under so-called Free Trade Agreements have significantly
cut back upon even the public health concessions made under the Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 25; see, e.g., Abbott & Reichman, supra note 33. See also Thomas Cottier,
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Law—The Impact of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 9 at 173-99.
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must be allowed broad latitude to ensure that this system remains
pro-competitive, with affordable access to knowledge inputs and
outputs for both creators and users of knowledge goods. By the
same token, WTO Members must retain sufficient autonomy and
power to preserve the supply of global public goods that are indispensable to both growth and welfare in a properly functioning
worldwide intellectual property regime. 118
With specific regard to the promotion of innovation as such,
concerned governments must make strenuous efforts to resist
claims that the technology exporting industries know what is best
for the rest of the world. In reality, legal scholars and economists
have never been less certain about the levels of IP protection likely
to preserve these industries’ long-term competitive advantages
even in their home countries. 119 We do not stand at the end of intellectual property history, as the high-protectionist lobby wants
us to believe. Nor will ever-stronger IPRs and ever higher levels of
harmonization redound to the benefit of even the most developed
countries, let alone the rest of the world.
On the contrary, we have crossed a new historical threshold
where an emerging transnational system of innovation in an integrated global market place with an interconnected research community breeds unprecedented opportunities and uncharted means
of realizing them. Far from locking in the sixteenth and twentieth
century intellectual property models of the past, we need new
models, and we need time and space to experiment with them, and
with new legal approaches to finding the best balance of private
and public interests for this global economy. It is precisely a time
for experimentation, 120 comparable to the period in the 1880s,
when the Paris and Berne Conventions were first negotiated. It is
not a time to codify obsolete approaches and standards that are
likely to boomerang against the long-term interests of developed
countries as well as to undermine economic growth and human
welfare in the developing countries.
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